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A B S T R A C T   
In the present study, we evaluate the suppression effect by asking participants to make inferences with everyday 
conditionals (“if A, then B”; “if Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre”), choosing between three 
possible conclusions (“she went to the theatre”; “she did not go to the theatre”; “it cannot be concluded”). We test 
how these inferences can be influenced by three factors: a) when the content of the conditional induces us to 
think about disabling conditions that prevent us from accepting the consequent (A and ¬B) or alternative con-
ditions that induce us to think about other antecedents that could also lead to the consequent (¬A and B), b) 
when explicit information is given about what really happened (e.g. Ana found a friend but they did not go to the 
theatre; or Ana did not find a friend but she went to the theatre) and c) when participants have to look for 
concrete disabling (e.g. Ana’s friend had to work) and alternative cases (e.g. Ana’s sister wanted to go to the 
theatre) before making the inferences. Previous studies have shown what were called “suppression effects”: 
disabling conditions reduced valid inferences while considering alternatives led to a reduction in fallacies. These 
two “suppression effects” were shown in Experiment 1: a) in an Implicit condition that included just the content 
factor of the conditional and b) with a greater magnitude in a second Explicit condition that included the three 
factors (content, explicit information and search for counterexamples). Experiment 2 compared the same Explicit 
condition with another in which participants, instead of looking for counterexamples, completed a control task of 
looking for synonyms. In addition, half the participants looked for a few items (2 cases) and the other half for 
many items (5 cases). Results again showed the suppressing effect in all the conditions, but the magnitude was 
greater in the counterexample condition. No relevant differences were obtained according to the number of cases 
generated; the most relevant result was that the factors provided an additive effect on the suppression.   
People draw conclusions from conditionals such as 
(1) “if Cristina ran, then she took the train” (if A, then B) 
using their knowledge about the world and their logical knowledge. For 
example, knowing that “Cristina ran”, most people choose the valid 
conclusion “she took the train” when they are given three possible ones 
(She took the train/She did not take the train/Nothing follows) (e.g. see 
Evans et al., 1993). However, knowing that “Cristina took the train”, 
most people conclude that “she ran” instead of the valid inference 
“Nothing follows”, from a material implication in propositional logic (e. 
g. see, Evans et al., 1993). The first inference is a Modus Ponens (MP; If 
A, then B; A, therefore B) while the second is a fallacy, called Affirmation 
of the Consequent (AC; If A, then B; B, therefore A). Table 1 shows the 
two valid inferences (MP and MT) and the two fallacies (AC and DA) 
resulting from affirming or denying the antecedent and the consequent 
of a conditional. 
Mental logic theories (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994) have 
proposed the existence of a mental rule for modus ponens. When rea-
soners find a propositional argument that matches the MP structure (If 
A, then B; A), they automatically apply the mental rule to conclude “B,” 
which explains the high proportion of MP endorsements (see Evans 
et al., 1993 and Nickerson, 2015, for reviews). There has not been a 
similar rule proposed for fallacies. One explanation for this is that the 
frequency of fallacies depends on the conditionals’ content, while valid 
inferences do not (e.g., Rumain et al., 1983). 
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Based on the mental model theory, Byrne (1989) demonstrated that 
the modus ponens inference could be suppressed by adding information 
to the logical argument. This study demonstrated that the conditional’s 
content also influences the MP inference, and therefore, the existence of 
a mental rule for valid inferences (MP) but not for fallacies was ques-
tioned (Byrne, 1989; Espino & Byrne, 2020). 
Since the publication of the original studies of suppression (Byrne, 
1989; Cummins et al., 1991), many other studies have been carried out 
and the main deductive theories have had to be adjusted to explain the 
suppression effect. Despite many studies on suppression, some doubts 
remain about the conditions in which suppression occurs and whether 
the theories can easily explain everything, as shown in recent papers 
(Cariani & Rips, 2017; Espino & Byrne, 2020; Oaksford & Chater, 2020). 
In these studies, two conditions are critical and involve the action of 
counterexamples (following the example of conditional (1)):  
- Alternative conditions allow another antecedent but the same 
consequent (e.g. Cristina found a taxi and took the train; she did not 
need to run)  
- Disabling conditions prevent the consequent from happening even if 
the antecedent happens (e.g., a twisted ankle meant that even if 
Cristina ran, she would be too late to take the train). 
This study aims to clarify some factors implicated in the suppression 
effect. 
1. Experimental procedures to produce suppression of 
inferences 
Earlier studies (see Cariani & Rips, 2017) used three procedures to 
create a suppression effect (the reduction of valid inferences and 
fallacies): 
The first consists of using Enabling conditions, also called Addi-
tional conditions (see Espino & Byrne, 2020). For example, if after the 
conditional (1) “if Cristina ran, then she took the train”, participants 
read 
(2) “if Cristina’s ankle recovered, then she took the train”, 
they tended to suppress the MP inference “she took the train” when 
provided with the information that “she ran”. When participants 
consider additional content that may affect the relationship between the 
antecedent and the consequent of a conditional, they are more likely to 
suppress valid inferences (Byrne, 1989). 
The second procedure uses Disabling conditionals, also called 
Contravening conditions (see Cariani & Rips, 2017). For example, if 
after the conditional (1) “if Cristina ran, then she took the train”, par-
ticipants read 
(3) “if Cristina’s ankle is twisted, then she did not take the train”; 
they were again less keen to make the modus ponens inference that 
Cristina took the train, knowing that “Cristina ran”. 
In both cases (1 & 2; 1 & 3), the second conditional suppressed the 
valid inferences (modus ponens and the modus tollens) but not the fal-
lacies (see Cariani & Rips, 2017; Markovits et al., 2010). In the first case, 
to accept a conclusion, one must consider an additional condition (a 
healthy ankle). In the second case, a condition (a twisted ankle) can 
prevent the conclusion. 
The third procedure implies the use of Alternative conditions. For 
example, if after presenting the conditional (1) “if Cristina ran, then she 
took the train”, participants read 
(4) “if Cristina found a taxi, then she took the train”, 
they were less likely, given this information, to accept the Affirmation of 
the Consequent fallacy, “Cristina took the train; therefore, she ran”. The 
same happened for the Denial of the antecedent, the other fallacy, but 
not for the valid inferences. This effect can be explained by the fact that 
people understand the existence of other possibilities (e.g., not only 
running but also taking a taxi) that allow the same consequent, and 
therefore, they conclude “nothing follows”1 (Cariani & Rips, 2017; 
Cummins, 1995). 
In these three procedures, the conditional (1) is followed by another 
conditional (2, 3, or 4). Cariani and Rips (2017) called the effect ob-
tained with these three procedures “explicit suppression”. Later studies 
showed that the suppression effect did not require the inclusion of a 
second conditional, just additional information that would lead people 
to think of disabling conditions or alternative possibilities. For example, 
after reading conditional (1), when participants were informed that 
“there were taxis available”, they suppressed the conclusion that “Cris-
tina ran”, and chose “I cannot conclude whether or not she ran” (because 
she could have taken a taxi). Some authors (e.g., De Neys et al., 2002, 
2003b; Markovits & Quinn, 2002) have long demonstrated these effects 
of disablers (also called contravening conditions) and alternatives in 
inferential reasoning, shown even without explicit information of 
counterexamples (e.g., Cummins, 1995; Markovits, 1986; Thompson, 
1995). 
It has also been demonstrated that some factors influence these ef-
fects, such as the strength of the alternative conditions in memory 
(Quinn & Markovits, 1998), participants’ working memory spans, the 
strategies used, the options given in the conclusion, whether the con-
clusions are formulated with a degree of certainty (Geiger & Oberauer, 
2007) or in a dichotomic way (Markovit et al., 2012). In general, valid 
MP inferences are more likely to be reduced when disablers can be easily 
retrieved from long-term memory (Bonnefond et al., 2014; De Neys 
et al., 2002, 2003b; Markovits & Quinn, 2002; Simoneau & Markovits, 
2003). Recently, Markovits et al. (2017) and Verschueren et al. (2005a, 
2005b) have studied how people can be classified depending on their 
tendency to look for counterexamples, while others seem to have a more 
probabilistic strategy (Brisson & Markovits, 2020). In any case, using a 
particular strategy does not increase the overall number of logical re-
sponses (see Markovits et al., 2017). 
Table 1 
Structure and example of the four logical inferences with the conditional, cat-
egorical premise and conclusion. The symbols “¬” and “∴” mean “not” and 
“therefore”, respectively.  
Conditional premise 
If she ran, she took the train  
Categorical premise Conclusion 
Valid inferences 
Modus ponens (MP) 
If A, B; A ∴ B 
She ran She took the train 
Modus tollens (MT) 
If A, B; ¬B ∴ ¬A 
She did not take the train She did not run  
Fallacies 
Affirm consequent (AC) 
If A, B; B ∴ A 
She took the train She ran 
Deny antecedent (DA) 
If A, B; ¬A ∴ ¬B 
She did not run She did not take the train  
1 Although the prediction is an increase in “nothing follows” responses, many 
studies used an indirect estimation, using the reduction of the frequency of 
endorsed fallacies. The indirect measure is not clear because it includes changes 
in the frequency of the unexpected third conclusion (e.g. in AC; “if a, b; b, 
therefore …” the “not a” conclusion is computed as a suppression effect). In 
both experiments, we compute the “nothing follows” conclusions to test 
suppression. 
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2. Theoretical approaches explaining inference suppression 
Different theories have tried to explain the results of suppression 
studies: some of them based on logic (see e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998; 
Rips, 1994), including pragmatic implicatures and context-sensitivity 
(Cariani & Rips, 2017), others on suppositions (see Evans, 2007), on 
probability (see e.g., Cruz et al., 2015; Evans, 2012; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 
2009) or on mental models (Byrne, 1989; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). 
Probabilistic approaches to deduction with conditionals (if A, then B; 
e.g. If Cristina runs, she will take the train; see Geiger & Oberauer, 2007) 
propose that people’s confidence in a conclusion (e.g., Cristina took the 
train) depends on the subjective conditional probability of the conse-
quent, given the antecedent p(B/A) i.e., the probability of Cristina tak-
ing the train given that she ran (p(Take-Train/Run)). Instances that alter 
the conditional probability will also influence inference acceptance, for 
example, disabling cases such as having a twisted ankle, or an alterna-
tive such as taking a taxi instead of running would reduce the acceptance 
for valid inferences and fallacies, respectively. 
The mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Khemlani 
et al., 2018) states that people represent conditionals as mental possi-
bilities (a model of reality known as a mental model) that include the 
case A & B and an implicit mental footnote indicating that other possi-
bilities exist, but are not initially represented. In the conditional (1), the 
possibility that “Cristina ran, and she took the train” is represented:
However, depending on the context, content and knowledge, 
different instances may also be represented, such as “¬A & ¬B” and “¬A 
& B” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Quelhas et al., 2010, 2017), and 
inferences will depend on the possibilities represented:
For example, knowing that Cristina can find a taxi (she does not need 
to run), people represent the alternative model “¬A B”. In this case, there 
are two models in which B is present (the initial model AB and ¬A B), 
and when we tell participants that Cristina took the train (B), they are 
less likely to accept the fallacy “she ran” (A) because they have another 
possibility represented (Cristina did not run, that is, ¬A). This extra 
model could explain the suppression of fallacies. Similarly, the sup-
pression of valid inferences occurs when participants think of disabling 
conditions, “A ¬B” cases, such as “Cristina had a twisted ankle”. Given A 
(Cristina ran), they are less prone to conclude B (she took the train), as 
they have in mind a model with “¬B”, which is inconsistent with the 
model “A B”. 
Cariani and Rips (2017) proposed a model of suppression related to 
the mental model theory without assuming mental models where the 
meaning of a conditional (semantic) is captured by one indicative con-
ditional rather than many, as proposed by the mental model theory 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The suppression effect results from 
conversational pragmatic principles that alter the scope of the context in 
which people evaluate the argument. For example, participants assume 
that when they are told conditional (1), it is because there is a common 
ground knowledge based on typical properties (If you are in a hurry and 
run, you can catch the train) and this excludes atypical ones (such as 
your ankle is twisted and you cannot run fast). Participants consider the 
set of possibilities consistent with an argument. However, when addi-
tional information is given (as a contravening condition, e.g., “if Cris-
tina’s ankle is twisted, then she did not take the train”), people 
reevaluate the possibilities. In this case, most participants would not 
accept that “Cristina ran and took the train”. 
3. The role of explicit premises and thinking about concrete 
cases 
As we have seen, authors have used different experimental proced-
ures to suppress inferences: using two conditionals, using an additional 
premise after the conditional or just using alternative or disabling 
content. 
Alternative content induces us to think of alternative conditions that 
also lead to the same consequent: 
(5) “If María studies hard, then she will get good grades”. 
Some students may think of other ways to get good grades without 
studying hard, such as cheating in the exam. 
Disabling content induces us to think of disabling conditions that 
could prevent the consequent, 
(6) “If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre”. 
People can find many circumstances that would prevent Ana from 
going to the theatre, such as going to a party instead. 
Whether the content of the conditional alone can lead to suppression 
has been brought into question. Cariani and Rips (2017) compared the 
results from different suppression studies and sustain that suppression 
effects are more evident with the three traditional procedures (enabling- 
contravening conditions and alternative conditions). They questioned 
the robustness of the suppression effect in “Implicit suppression” studies, 
when participants receive one conditional with content that leads them 
to think of disabling or alternative conditions. Moreover, they pointed 
out that most of these studies reporting suppression used a different task: 
asking participants to give a response on a scale that varies on a con-
tinuum between “very sure that I can draw this conclusion” to “very sure 
that I cannot draw this conclusion” (e.g. Cummins, 1995; De Neys et al., 
2003a; Geiger & Oberauer, 2007). As previously mentioned, this could 
lead participants to make an inference not assuming the truth of the 
premises, but answering to the degree of confidence that should be 
placed in the consequent. They cite three other experiments with more 
traditional conclusions, but find that their effects are unclear and differ 
from each other (see Cariani & Rips, 2017; p. 582). 
In our study, we use an “implicit suppression” procedure referred to 
by Cariani and Rips (2017), but using a traditional inference task with 
the three possible discrete conclusions (such as in Table 2). In Experi-
ment 1, we test whether it is the conditional’s content leading to 
thinking about alternatives and disabler conditions that produces the 
suppression effect. We also test whether the magnitude of suppression is 
similar to that in a condition with unambiguous and explicit indications 
of alternatives or disabling conditions. According to theoretical models, 
such as probabilistic and suppositional approaches and models based on 
pragmatics, we would expect a maximum suppression effect to be ob-
tained when participants are explicitly informed of the existence of 
alternative or disabling conditions for a particular conditional (for 
example, by changing the conditional probability, as mentioned in the 
previous section). However, if participants represent particular cases (as 
the model theory proposes), an increase of the suppression effect would 
be obtained when participants think of different concrete cases in 
addition to the explicit information. We will test this possibility in 
Experiment 2. If a participant only needs evidence of the existence of a 
disabling condition to reduce a modus ponens inference, whatever 
source provides the effect will be sufficient, and no additional effect 
should emerge. However, if the sources influence different processes 
during the inference, we would expect additive effects. 
Few studies have tried to test whether the concrete number of al-
ternatives and disabling conditions directly affects the reduction of valid 
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inferences and fallacies. Markovits and Quinn (2002) in their original 
model proposed that after successful retrieval of a single counterex-
ample, the search process stops as there would be no advantage in 
accessing more counterexamples. However, De Neys et al. (2002) had 
mixed results, testing frequency and processing times. The authors 
suggested that the number of disabling conditions could influence not 
only valid inferences but also fallacies. The same authors in another 
study (De Neys et al., 2003a) manipulated the number of explicit 
counterexamples (0 or 4 alternatives or disablers) and found the ex-
pected effect for affirmative inferences (MP and AC). In contrast, the 
effect was less evident in the negative inferences (MT and DA). A 
possible explanation is that the additional processing requirements for 
these negative inferences burden the counterexample search process. 
It is difficult to make specific differential predictions from the 
deductive theories. They can all integrate different results, and in some 
cases, opposite results. Probabilistic approaches maintain that people 
accept a conclusion when it is believable. We could attribute to proba-
bilistic approaches the primary role of factors such as the general 
probability of the conditional rather than the role of the number of 
particular cases such as disabling conditions, which is the argument used 
in some studies (Geiger & Oberauer, 2007). Nevertheless, it seems 
plausible that if one thinks of many alternatives or disabling cases, the 
perceived probability will change. Considering Cariani and Rips’s 
(2017) proposal, when participants are told explicitly of alternatives or 
disabling conditions, we can expect suppression. However, we would 
not expect an increase in suppression when asking participants to think 
of concrete instances because there are no semantic or pragmatic 
changes. On the other hand, because the model theory assumes people 
consider models of reality, the concrete cases should affect the in-
ferences. But once a critical case (such as “¬A B”) has been represented, 
why would one expect many cases to be more effective than just a few? 
4. Experiment 1. Conditional content for the suppression effect 
As previously mentioned, Cariani and Rips (2017) maintained that 
the empirical results of suppression are not precise when only one 
conditional is presented instead of two. They also questioned whether 
some suppression effects, found previously in the literature, could be 
due to not using the traditional inference task with three options for 
conclusions. In this experiment, we test suppression with one condi-
tional and use the standard inference set of conclusions. We are inter-
ested in testing whether the suppression effect is obtained in a simple 
implicit condition depending on the conditional content. We tested 
participants with two types of conditional: alternative contents that lead 
people to think of alternatives to the antecedent (¬A cases that lead to 
the same consequent). These conditionals should suppress fallacies by 
increasing the frequency of “nothing follows” conclusions. The second 
type relates to disabling contents that lead participants to think of 
disabling conditions (¬B even when A occurs), and should suppress valid 
inferences. The contents were selected from previous studies (Couto 
et al., 2010; Cummins, 1995) and from a pilot study conducted to in-
crease the number of conditionals (see the Materials section in Experi-
ment 1 and Appendix A for more details). 
Based on the previously reviewed studies, we created an explicit 
suppression condition to contrast with an implicit suppression condition 
to test whether the implicit condition can produce suppression and if a 
difference in the magnitude of the suppression effect exists between the 
conditions. 
The suppression procedure structure in this study is shown in Table 2 
(first and second rows). In the implicit condition, in each trial, partici-
pants carry out a control task, in which they generate synonyms for a 
given word. We then present the conditional with disabling or alterna-
tive contents (see Appendix B for the conditionals list) followed by the 
minor premise, and ask participants to make the four inferences (MP, 
DA, AC, MT). In contrast, in the Explicit condition, we provide partici-
pants with disabling or alternative information, stating what happened 
after the conditional. For example, “we know that A occurred, but B did 
not.” Following this, we ask participants to generate Disablers or Al-
ternatives and then make the four inferences (see Table 2, second row). 
Therefore, in the Explicit condition (with concrete cases; as it is 
which was used in this Experiment), there are two sources of informa-
tion for alternatives and disablers that are not present in the Implicit 
condition: the explicit mention of there being disablers/alternatives and 
the search for specific disablers/alternative cases. 
We test an additional factor to determine whether the number of 
concrete alternatives and disablers represented affects the magnitude of 
the suppression. Half the participants search for a few particular cases 
(two), and the other half search for many cases (five). Since executive 
function activity can influence the inference task, we created the control 
task for the implicit condition, where participants search for few (two) 
or many (five) synonyms. The synonyms are neutral words, not related 
to alternatives or disablers, and therefore not expected to produce any 
suppression effect. 
If the content is enough to produce the predicted suppressing effect, 
this would appear in both conditions (Implicit and Explicit). However, if 
the suppression requires participants to consider explicit information, 
Table 2 
Structure of the suppression trials for a disabling conditional used in Experiment 
1 (rows 1 and 2) and Experiment 2 (rows 2 and 3). See text for more details.  
Implicit procedure Experiment 1- example 





Write two possible synonyms for (big) 
———————————————————————————  
If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre 
Ana finds a friend, therefore,    
1) Ana goes to the theatre  
2) Ana does not go to the theatre  
3) It cannot be concluded 




Experiments 1 and 2 - example 
Conditional: 
Explicit 
information:   
Search for 
alternative or 





If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre 
However, we know that Ana found a friend but she did not go to 
the theatre  
Write two possible cases in which that could have happened: 
——————————————————————————— 
If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre 
Ana finds a friend, therefore,   
1) Ana goes to the theatre  
2) Ana does not go to the theatre  
3) It cannot be concluded 





Experiment 2 example 
Conditional: 
Explicit 







If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre 
However, we know that Ana found a friend but she did not go to 
the theatre  
Write two possible synonyms for big 
——————————————————————————— 
If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre 
Ana finds a friend, therefore,   
1) Ana goes to the theatre  
2) Ana does not go to the theatre  
3) It cannot be concluded 
…. (the 3 other inferences follow: AC, DA & MT)  
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the suppressing effect will only appear in the Explicit condition. Finally, 
if the number of alternatives or disablers generated is responsible for the 
suppression effect, we could expect a more significant suppression effect 
in the many cases group than in the few cases group. 
4.1. Participants 
Sixty-three adults between 19 and 27 years (M = 19.64; SD = 1.50) 
participated in the study. Fifty were women with a mean age of 19.48 
years (SD = 1.45) and thirteen were men whose mean age was 20.23 
years (SD = 1.60). The size of each group was determined before data 
collection and based on effect sizes in the literature. All participants 
were native Spanish speakers and were recruited in colleges or univer-
sities in Granada. They were compensated with course credits. Before 
starting the experiment, they read a consent form complying with the 
University Research Ethics Committee guidelines. 
4.2. Materials 
We used twelve conditionals, half having many alternatives avail-
able, the other half many disablers (see Appendix B). We selected these 
conditionals based on previous studies (Couto et al., 2010; Cummins, 
1995) and a pilot study (see Appendix A) to reach the 12 conditional 
sentences. 
Materials test: we asked 33 adults (from 20 to 54 years old) to test 12 
conditionals of the same kind, similar to those previously mentioned. We 
presented six conditionals to each participant (in a disabler or an 
alternative condition), and they had to write down on a sheet of paper as 
many counterexamples as possible for each conditional. An example of 
the alternative condition is: 
“If María jumps into a swimming pool, then she will get wet. 
However, we know that María did not jump into the pool, but she got 
wet. 
Write down as many explanations as you can think of for this fact.” 
For the disabling condition, we negated the consequent: 
“If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre. 
However, we know that she did not go to the theatre, but she found a 
friend. 
Write down as many explanations as you can think of for this fact.” 
Of the 12 conditionals tested, we selected three as having many al-
ternatives available but few disablers and three others as having many 
disablers available but few alternatives. The time spent generating the 
maximum number of alternatives and disablers was no longer than 2 
min. 
With the complete set of 12 final conditionals (six from previous 
studies and six selected in the pilot study), we carried out our experi-
ment using E-prime software v.2. 
Participants received the 12 conditionals (6 with many alternatives 
available and 6 with many disablers available). Participants were 
randomly assigned to two groups to generate either two or five coun-
terexamples (explicit condition) or synonyms (implicit condition) for 
each conditional. For each conditional, they also had to make the 4 in-
ferences (MP, MT, AC, DA) in a total of 48 inferences. 
The six synonyms trials for the Implicit procedure condition and six 
counterexample trials for the Explicit procedure condition were pre-
sented in block order (Implicit vs Explicit), both blocks being counter-
balanced by participants. 
4.3. Procedure and design 
Participants were tested in a quiet room using a computer to display 
stimuli and record responses on a keyboard controlled by E-prime 
software v.2. (Schneider et al., 2002). The sessions lasted between 15 
and 30 min. Participants were distributed randomly in two groups 
depending on the number of elements they had to generate: Few items 
(two) or Many items (five). 
They read the instructions on the screen to ensure comprehension of 
the “Synonyms” and “Counterexample” tasks. Each participant then 
performed twelve trials: 6 for the Explicit Procedure condition (with 3 
alternatives and 3 disablers in the generation task) and 6 for the Implicit 
Procedure condition (with 6 synonyms in the generation task). 
Implicit condition: The participants started with the generation task, 
where they had to generate 2 or 5 synonyms depending on their assigned 
group. For example: 
Type 2 synonyms for the word “good” [generation task - synonyms] 
After that, a conditional was displayed on the screen, followed by the 
minor premise and the three response options. Participants had to press 
one of three keys to select the appropriate conclusion. An example of the 
Affirmation of the consequent (AC) is: 
If Vera turns on the air conditioning, then she will be cold 
[conditional] 
Knowing that Vera was cold, what can you conclude? [minor 
premise]   
1. Vera turned on the air conditioning  
2. Vera did not turn on the air conditioning  
3. It cannot be concluded 
Press 1, 2 or 3 according to your response 
For each conditional, they were asked to make all four inferences. 
Once the participant had completed the inferences, a new generation 
task would appear, followed by the conditional and inferences. 
Explicit condition: In the explicit condition, the participants started 
with the conditional, followed by explicit alternative or disabler infor-
mation and the generation task. For example: 
If Vera turns on the air conditioning, then she will be cold 
[conditional] 
However, we know that Vera turned on the air conditioning but did 
not feel cold [explicit information] 
Type 2 possible cases in which that could have happened [generation 
task - counterexamples]. 
After completing the generation task, they made the four inferences 
as described above for the implicit condition. 
The six synonyms trials for the Implicit procedure condition and six 
counterexample trials for the Explicit procedure condition were pre-
sented in blocks (Implicit vs Explicit); the presentation of the blocks was 
counterbalanced. 
In the “Few items” group, participants had 1.50 min for each gen-
eration task (synonyms and counterexamples), meaning that for each 
word they had 1.50 min to generate two synonyms and for each con-
ditional in the explicit condition they had 1.50 min to generate two 
counterexamples. In the “Many items” group, participants had 2 min for 
each generation task. The time was fixed based on the results in a pilot 
study without a time limit. 
In this way, we created a 2 (Group: few items vs. many items) × 2 
(Condition: Implicit vs. Explicit) × 2 (Counterexample: Alternatives vs. 
Disablers) × 2 (Inference: Valid vs. Fallacy) mixed design with the group 
variable manipulated between participants. 
The suppression effect was computed for the traditional, logical and 
valid conclusions (interpretation of the conditional material implica-
tion): endorsed valid inferences and “nothing follows” conclusions for 
fallacies. 
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4.4. Results Experiment 1 
The data are available at https://sl.ugr.es/0aVB for the two 
experiments. 
As expected, fewer cases were generated in the Few items group than 
in the Many items group, for both the Explicit Condition (Few items: M 
= 1.94, SD = 0.11; Many items: M = 4.16, SD = 0.62; U-Mann Whitney 
test Z = 6.97, η2 = 0.74, p < .001) and the Implicit Condition (Few items: 
M = 1.71, SD = 0.21; Many items: M = 3.06, SD = 0.88; Z = 5.91, η2 =
0.55, p < .001). 
We carried out an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the frequency of 
correct answers (valid) in a 2 (Condition: Explicit vs Implicit) by 2 
(Counterexample: Alternative vs Disabler) by 2 (Inferences: Valid vs 
Fallacies) by 2 (Group: Few items vs Many items) design with the first 
three factors manipulated within-participants and the last between- 
participants. We computed the affirmation of the consequent for 
modus ponens, the negation of the antecedent for modus tollens and the 
“nothing follows” conclusion for the two fallacies (AC and DA) as correct 
inferences. Note that computing this response directly, as a measure of 
the suppression effect, is a stricter criterion than just looking for non- 
acceptance of the fallacies, which is consistent with two possible alter-
natives (the nothing follows and ¬A in the case of AC and B in the case of 
DA). 
More correct inferences were made with Valid inferences than with 
Fallacies (72% vs. 42%; F(1, 61) = 57.46, p < .001, η2 = 0.49) and the 
same happened for Alternatives compared to Disablers (74% vs. 40%; F 
(1, 61) = 205.99, p < .001, η2 = 0.77) (see Table 3 and Table C1). In 
general, results reveal a traditional trend that shows that Valid in-
ferences are more frequently accepted than Fallacies. Note again that we 
compute “nothing follows” responses for Fallacies, which is the correct 
response from a material implication interpretation of the conditional 
and the logical response. As expected, considering Alternatives increases 
the correct inferences in Fallacies and considering Disablers reduces 
Valid inferences. This suppressing effect was greater for the Explicit 
Condition than for the Implicit Condition, with fewer Valid inferences in 
the first (54% vs. 60%; F(1, 61) = 19.5, p < .001, η2 = 0.24). No effect of 
Group (few items vs many items) was found (58% vs. 56%; F(1, 61) =
0.34, p = .56, η2 = 0.01). 
Results also showed a significant interaction between Condition 
(Explicit vs Implicit) and Counterexample (Alternative vs Disabler) (F(1, 
61) = 61.23, p < .001, η2 = 0.50), between Condition (Explicit vs Im-
plicit) and Inference (Valid vs Fallacies) (F(1,61) = 35.02, p < .001, η2 =
0.37) and the interaction of Counterexample (Alternative vs Disabler) 
with Inference (Valid vs Fallacies) (F(1,61) = 28.38, p < .001, η2 =
0.25). 
The interaction showed that different results were obtained in the 
Implicit condition. The generation of synonyms made before the infer-
ence, which acts as a control, should not influence the process. Actually, 
the analysis for this condition shows no interaction between 
Counterexample and Inference (F(1,61) = 1.23, p = .27, η2 = 0.02), but 
more correct responses for Alternatives than Disablers (64% vs. 52% F 
(1,61) = 37.12, p < .001, η2 = 0.37) and more correct Valid inferences 
than Fallacies (87% vs. 30%; F(1,61) = 125.44, p < .001, η2 = 0.69). 
Therefore, the content per se can provide the suppressing effect on in-
ferences (see Fig. 1). 
The interaction between Condition and Counterexample shows that 
the suppressing effect is significant for the Explicit condition (F(1,61) =
198.54, p < .001, η2 = 0.77) and for the Implicit condition (F(1,61) =
50.13, p < .001, η2 = 0.45), but greater for the first. Actually, more 
correct inferences were made for the Explicit condition than for Implicit 
with Alternatives (F(1,61) = 11.69, p = .001, η2 = 0.16) but fewer with 
Disablers (F(1,61) = 89.50, p < .001, η2 = 0.60): which means a greater 
suppressing effect for the Explicit condition, as expected. 
The same happened in the interaction between Condition and 
Inference. More inferences were endorsed with Valid inferences than 
with Fallacies in the Explicit condition (F(1,61) = 8.25, p < .01, η2 =
0.12) and also in the Implicit Condition (F(1,61) = 81.47, p < .001, η2 =
0.57). However, more correct valid inferences (fewer suppressing ef-
fects) were obtained in the Implicit Condition (F(1,61) = 64.93, p <
.001, η2 = 0.52) and more correct inferences with Fallacies were ob-
tained in the Explicit condition (F(1,61) = 8.43, p < .01, η2 = 0.12). 
Finally, the interaction between Inference and Counterexample 
showed that the difference between Valid inferences and Fallacies was 
greater for Disabling (F(1,61) = 97.18, p < .001, η2 = 0.61) than for 
Alternative conditions (F(1,61) = 21.75, p < .001, η2 = 0.26). 
4.5. Discussion 
Participants made inferences with two kinds of conditionals: con-
tents that induced them to think of disabling conditions and contents 
that induced them to think of alternative conditionals. Fewer valid in-
ferences were endorsed with disabling-content conditionals and fewer 
fallacies were accepted when the alternative-content conditionals were 
presented. Therefore, we could conclude that in the Implicit condition, 
the content of the conditional per se can create this suppressing effect of 
fallacies and valid inferences (given more correct fallacies and fewer 
valid inferences). The magnitude of the suppression of valid inferences 
and fallacies increased when we informed participants about a 
“disabling” or alternative condition and asked them to generate two or 
five explanations. Thus, Experiment 1 shows that the suppression effect 
was greater in the Explicit condition: when participants were informed 
that the antecedent happened but the consequent did not follow (or vice 
versa) and they looked for disabling or alternatives cases. Moreover, it 
did not make any difference whether participants were asked to 
generate two or five cases for the inference task. 
Therefore, the main result in this study has been to show that the 
Implicit condition produced suppression effects. Cariani and Rips (2017) 
questioned whether suppression could happen in an implicit procedure. 
Table 3 
Experiment 1. Mean percentage of logically valid conclusions in bold (and standard deviations) for Inferences (valid, fallacies), Condition (explicit, implicit), 
Counterexample (alternative, disabler) and Group (few items, many items).   
Explicit procedure Implicit procedure 
Alternatives Disablers Alternatives Disablers 
Valid Fallacies Valid Fallacies Valid Fallacies Valid Fallacies 
Few items 
Accept 83 (0.20) 19 (0.28) 34 (0.30) 80 (0.20) 91 (0.18) 44 (0.37) 79 (0.29) 73 (0.31) 
Nothing follows 16 (0.19) 80 (0.29) 65 (0.31) 19 (0.21) 9 (0.18) 55 (0.37) 20 (0.29) 25 (0.31)  
Many items 
Accept 82 (0.21) 26 (0.38) 42 (0.35) 78 (0.24) 86 (0.21) 51 (0.36) 80 (0.24) 77 (0.28) 
Nothing follows 15 (0.20) 71 (0.38) 57 (0.35) 19 (0.22) 13 (0.21) 48 (0.37) 18 (0.25) 20 (0.29)  
Average 
Accept 83 (0.21) 23 (0.33) 38 (0.33) 79 (0.22) 88 (0.20) 47 (0.36) 79 (0.26) 75 (0.29) 
Nothing follows 15 (0.20) 75 (0.34) 61 (0.33) 19 (0.22) 11 (0.20) 51 (0.37) 19 (0.27) 23 (0.30)  
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The suppression effect was greater in the Explicit condition, but we 
cannot be sure whether this was caused by the explicit information given 
about the existence of alternatives and disablers or because participants 
actively looked for those concrete cases, or by both. In Experiment 2 we 
try to answer this question. 
5. Experiment 2. Explicit information vs looking for 
counterexamples 
In this second experiment, participants are always explicitly 
informed of a general disabling or alternative condition. We test 
whether asking them to look for disabling or alternative cases increases 
the suppression effect. We use the same Explicit condition as in Exper-
iment 1 and create a new Explicit condition in which participants do not 
search for counterexamples; instead, after reading about the disabling or 
alternative condition, they carry out the control task of looking for 
synonyms. This control task is necessary because memory retrieval in-
volves additional executive functions that could impact the later infer-
ence process. The two procedures’ conditions for suppression are 
presented in Table 2 (second and third rows, respectively). In both 
conditions, participants are explicitly told that the consequent did not 
happen but the antecedent did (disabling) or that the consequent 
happened but not the antecedent (alternative). Therefore, the only dif-
ference between the two conditions is the generation task: participants 
either generate synonyms or counterexamples. 
If the explicit information is responsible for the suppression effect, 
then searching for counterexamples should not increase that effect. As 
such, the suppression would be the same in both conditions (generating 
counterexamples or synonyms) since participants have the same explicit 
information telling them about the existence of counterexamples for the 
conditional. On the other hand, if thinking of particular cases influences 
representations, as the model theory maintains, an increase of the sup-
pressing effect will occur in the counterexample condition compared to 
the synonyms condition. A final question is whether a more significant 
number of counterexamples will lead to an increase in suppression. 
Although the results in Experiment 1 did not show this effect, we again 
asked half the participants to search for many counterexamples (5) and 
the other half for just a few (2). 
5.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of sixty-six adults between 18 and 27 years (M 
= 19.41; SD = 1.73): fifty-eight women with a mean age of 19.40 years 
(SD = 1.76) and eight men whose mean age was 19.50 years (SD = 1.60). 
All participants spoke Spanish as their first language and were recruited 
in colleges or universities in Granada. They were compensated with 
course credits. Before starting the experiment, they read a consent form 
complying with the University Research Ethics Committee guidelines. 
5.2. Materials 
The same as used in Experiment 1 (see Appendix B). 
5.3. Procedure and design 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 with the following 
difference: in both conditions, participants were presented with the 

























Valid Fal lacies N/F Fal lacies Endorsed
Fig. 1. Mean percentage of logically correct responses for inferences (Valid, Fallacies) and fallacies endorsed (dotted bars), Condition (Explicit, Implicit) and 
Counterexample (Alternative, Disabler) in Experiment 1. 
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disabling condition (see Table 2). In the Counterexamples condition 
(explicit condition with concrete cases in Table 2), participants had to 
write two or five (depending on their group: few items vs. many items) 
counterexamples that could account for the facts described in the 
explicit information (see Table 2). By contrast, in the Synonyms condi-
tion (see explicit condition without cases in Table 2), participants were 
presented with a word and they had to write two or five (depending on 
their group) synonyms of that word. Everything else was identical to 
Experiment 1. We used a mixed design with Group (Few items vs Many 
items) manipulated between groups and Condition (Counterexamples vs 
Synonyms), Counterexample type (Alternative vs Disabler) and Infer-
ence (Valid vs Invalid) manipulated within participants. The suppres-
sion effect was computed as in Experiment 1. 
5.4. Results and discussion 
As expected, fewer cases were generated in the Few cases generation 
group than in the Many cases group for both the Counterexample (Few 
cases: M = 1.98, SD = 0.06; Many cases: M = 4.12, SD = 0.82; U-Mann 
Whitney test Z = 6.79, η2 = 0.65, p < .001) and the Synonyms condition 
(Few cases: M = 1.85 SD = 0.21; Many cases: M = 3.34, SD = 1.05; Z =
5.82, η2 = 0.50, p < .001) (see Table 4 and Table C2). 
We carried out an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the frequency of 
correct logical answers in a 2 (Condition: Counterexamples vs Syno-
nyms) by 2 (Counterexample type: Alternative vs Disabler) by 2 (In-
ferences: Valid vs Fallacies) by 2 (Group: Few items vs Many items) 
design, with the first three factors manipulated within-participants and 
the last between-participants. 
As in Experiment 1, participants made more correct Valid inferences 
than Fallacies (68% vs. 30%; F(1, 64) = 49.16, p < .001, η2 = 0.43); also, 
Disabling conditionals reduced the Valid inferences while Alternative 
conditionals increased the “nothing follows” correct conclusions. 
Therefore, more correct conclusions were obtained for the Alternative 
conditionals compared to the Disabling conditionals (53% vs. 37%; F (1, 
64) = 55.37, p < .001, η2 = 0.46). No effect of Group (generating 2 or 5 
items) (48% vs. 50%; F(1, 64) = 0.90, p = .35, η2 = 0.01) or Condition 
(49% vs. 49%; F(1, 64) = 0.07, p = .80, η2 < 0.01) was found. 
The results also showed three significant interactions, all with the 
factor Condition as a component: Condition (Counterexamples vs Syn-
onyms) and Inferences (Valid vs Fallacies) (F(1, 64) = 7.06, p = .01, η2 
= 0.10); Condition (Counterexamples vs Synonyms) and Counterex-
ample type (Alternative vs Disabler) (F(1, 64) = 12.95, p = .001, η2 =
0.17); and the same two factors with Group (Few items vs Many items) 
(F(1, 64) = 4.67, p = .04, η2 = 0.07). 
The first interaction shows that participants gave more correct re-
sponses to the Valid inferences (MP and MT) than to the Fallacies (DA 
and AC) in both conditions, as in Experiment 1. However, the suppres-
sion was stronger in the Counterexample condition (F(1, 64) = 26.85, p 
< .001, η2 = 0.30) than in the Synonyms condition (F(1, 64) = 51.35, p 
< .001, η2 = 0.45). 
Condition and Counterexample type show that the suppressing effect 
is significant for both procedures (see Fig. 2), the Counterexample 
condition (F(1,64) = 66.44, p < .001, η2 = 0.51) and the Synonyms 
condition (F(1,64) = 26.34, p < .001, η2 = 0.29), but greater for the first. 
Again, as expected, the suppressing effect was greater: more correct 
inferences were made for the Counterexample condition than for the 
Synonyms condition with Alternatives (F(1,64) = 10.39, p = .002, η2 =
0.14) but fewer with Disablers (F(1,64) = 6.01, p = .017, η2 = 0.09). 
To analyse the effect of the Group in the interaction, we analysed the 
two groups separately. In the Many items group, more correct conclu-
sions were made for Alternatives than for Disablers (64% vs. 37%; F 
(1,32) = 20.78, p < .001, η2 = 0.39), and participants endorsed more 
Valid inferences than Fallacies (66% vs. 43%; F(1,32) = 12.14, p < .001, 
η2 = 0.28). No other significant difference was found. Similarly, in the 
Few items group, more correct conclusions were made for the Alterna-
tives than for the Disablers (62% vs. 34%; F(1,32) = 40.32, p < .001, η2 
= 0.56), and more were endorsed for Valid inferences than for Fallacies 
(69% vs. 26%; F(1,32) = 40.24, p < .001, η2 = 0.56). The interaction was 
due to the fact that only in the Few items group was the interaction 
between Condition (Counterexamples vs Synonyms) and Counterex-
ample type (Alternative vs Disabler) significant (F(1,32) = 14.28, p =
.001, η2 = 0.31). The increase of the suppressing effect in the Synonyms 
condition reached significance only in the Few items group. 
6. General discussion 
In this research, we tested the suppression effect of valid inferences 
and fallacies. To do so, we used alternative-content conditionals that 
induce us to think of alternative antecedents for obtaining a consequent, 
and disabling-content conditionals that lead us to think of disabling 
conditions that prevent the consequent. In Experiment 1, those contents 
that led people to think of alternatives and disabling conditions pro-
duced an effect of suppressing fallacies and valid inferences, respec-
tively. This result is particularly interesting because Cariani and Rips 
(2017) maintained that the suppression of Modus Ponens in studies 
seems to require an explicit premise for alternative or disabling 
(contravening) conditions. They questioned the suppressing effect ob-
tained in studies that varied the content of the conditional. Some of these 
studies used response scales as conclusions, instead of using the standard 
deduction instructions and response format with the three options (see 
Table 2). The response scales could encourage participants to treat the 
inferences as a probabilistic task, regarding the certainty of the 
conclusion instead of its necessity (p.581–582). Experiment 1 shows that 
the suppression effect was present in the implicit procedure with the 
standard deduction instructions and response format. 
We also confirmed that the suppression effect was more significant in 
the Explicit Condition than in the Implicit one. In the Explicit condition, 
we told participants that there were alternatives or disabling conditions 
Table 4 
Experiment 2. Mean percentage of logically valid conclusions in bold (and standard deviations) for Inferences (valid, fallacies), Condition (counterexample, syno-
nyms), Counterexample type (alternative, disabler) and Group (few items, many items).   
Counterexample Synonyms 
Alternatives Disablers Alternatives Disablers 
Valid Fallacies Valid Fallacies Valid Fallacies Valid Fallacies 
Few items 
Accept 83 (0.24) 41 (0.39) 44 (0.38) 83 (0.24) 82 (0.25) 63 (0.40) 68 (0.32) 87 (0.23) 
Nothing follows 15 (0.23) 50 (0.41) 49 (0.38) 12 (0.22) 17 (0.24) 32 (0.41) 22 (0.28) 11 (0.22)  
Many items 
Accept 81 (0.24) 39 (0.39) 48 (0.35) 72 (0.31) 79 (0.28) 49 (0.46) 56 (0.38) 79 (0.31) 
Nothing follows 15 (0.20) 50 (0.40) 43 (0.35) 25 (0.30) 17 (0.27) 44 (0.47) 37 (0.39) 18 (0.31)  
Average 
Accept 82 (0.24) 40 (0.39) 46 (0.36) 78 (0.27) 80 (0.26) 56 (0.43) 62 (0.35) 83 (0.27) 
Nothing follows 15 (0.21) 50 (0.40) 46 (0.37) 18 (0.26) 17 (0.26) 38 (0.44) 30 (0.33) 15 (0.26)  
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and asked them to look for counterexamples before making the infer-
ence. In this case, the number of generated instances (few or many) did 
not make a difference. To make the Explicit and Implicit procedure 
conditions similar in complexity, we created a control condition where 
participants had to retrieve from memory synonyms instead of coun-
terexamples. In both conditions, participants had a task that required 
them to retrieve contents from long term memory; however, those 
contents only related to the inferences in one of the conditions (Explicit 
condition). In the Implicit condition in Experiment 1, the synonyms 
generation task preceded the conditional and the inferences. Consid-
ering the differences between the Implicit and Explicit conditions in 
Experiment 1 (see Table 2), one may ask: is it the presence of explicit 
information that increases the suppression effect or does searching for 
disabling and alternative cases have an additional suppression effect? In 
Experiment 2, we compared the Experiment 1 Explicit condition with a 
new condition. The only difference between the conditions in the second 
experiment was that in one condition, participants searched for coun-
terexamples (alternatives and disablers), whereas in the other condition, 
they had to search for synonyms. We created the synonyms task to 
control the possible effects of retrieving content from long term memory. 
Once more, results showed the suppression effect in the two Explicit 
Conditions (Counterexample and Synonyms conditions). However, 
when participants not only received the explicit information but also 
had to search for counterexamples (counterexample condition), the 
endorsement of valid inferences decreased when participants searched 
for disabling conditions (without affecting fallacies). When participants 
retrieved alternative cases, the correct conclusions for fallacies 
increased (without affecting valid inferences). We found that the 
increased suppression was significant only when participants searched 
for a few cases and not for many. We had not predicted this lack of 
improvement in the Many items group. One possibility is that the need 
to look for many counterexamples would force participants to go outside 
the mental set of possible related ones and find less prototypical cases, 
maybe with lower suitability as real counterexamples, thus reducing the 
benefit obtained when they only have to look for two. 
Another possibility is related to the fluency effect: the first counter-
examples are easily retrieved in the few items condition because of the 
greater strength of association, but when participants need to search for 
additional ones and have difficulty finding them (up to five items), they 
might get the impression that there are not many counterexamples 
available for that conditional. In any case, the results clearly show that 
1) looking for explicit alternatives and disablers improves the suppres-
sion of fallacies and valid inferences, but 2) having many cases does not 
produce more suppression than having few; actually, the opposite 
happened. As we mentioned in the introduction, deductive theories from 
different approaches have attempted to integrate and explain the results 
of initial studies on the suppression effect. They have tried to explain 
how disabling information (A & ¬B) and alternatives (¬A & B) influence 
people’s inferences. They should also explain that the suppression effect 
may arise from different sources:  
1. From participants’ general knowledge accessed by the meaning of 
the conditional  
2. From the cases explicitly mentioned in the problem  
3. From participants actively generating cases 
As we have seen, mental rule theories base their explanation on 
pragmatic effects (see Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994). In their 
model of suppression, Cariani and Rips (2017) also proposed the prag-
matic component as a key to explaining how suppression occurs: 
semantically, participants consider possibilities from a basic interpre-
tation of the conditional (strict interpretation). In addition, they adjust, 
adding and discarding possibilities when they acquire new evidence 

























Valid Fal lacies N/F Fal lacies Endorsed
Fig. 2. Mean percentage of logically correct responses for Inferences (Valid, Fallacies) and fallacies endorsed (dotted bars), Condition (Counterexamples, Synonyms) 
and Counterexamples type (Alternative, Disabler) in Experiment 2. 
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suppression procedures). Conversational rules are the base of the prag-
matic component. In the description of their model, they do not 
explicitly say how the content would lead to activation of the pragmatic 
component when no additional premises are included, as happened in 
the Implicit Procedure Condition. The model in its present form cannot 
predict that in Explicit conditions, the suppression effect increases when 
participants search for concrete cases, as in Experiment 2. One differ-
ence between this model and the mental model theory is how the con-
ditional is represented, depending on its meaning. 
In the mental model theory, through the modulation effect, a 
particular set of initial representations is created, depending on the 
meaning of the conditional (see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Quelhas 
et al., 2010, 2017). For example, as compared to a factual conditional 
(such as “if she watered the plants, they bloomed”), a counterfactual 
conditional (such as “if she had watered the plants, they would have 
bloomed”) induces an increase of MT and DA inferences because the 
initial representation for counterfactuals includes the model of “she did 
not water the plants and they did not bloom” (Byrne, 2016 for a review). 
Therefore, participants are willing to accept “she did not water the 
plants” when they know that the plants did not bloom (MT) or to accept 
the reverse (DA). Espino and Byrne (2020) demonstrated that the 
background knowledge conditions can produce a suppression effect 
even with counterfactual conditionals. They used the traditional explicit 
procedure of additional conditions to suppress the MT valid inference 
and the explicit alternative condition to suppress the DA fallacy. They 
explained the result by the fact that people represent conditionals in the 
additional procedure as a conjunction of the antecedents of the two 
conditionals and the alternative procedure as a disjunction. As we used 
disabling conditions instead of the traditional explicit procedure of 
additional conditions, we cannot test their proposal. 
The model theory assumes that people represent mental models and 
explains how the content leads them to represent additional information 
as a new mental model to be integrated by the modulation effect based 
on their knowledge (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Shared knowledge 
can induce us to think that if we find a friend, our earlier plans might 
change (for example, after reading “if Ana finds a friend, she will go to 
the theatre” and knowing that “Ana found a friend”, we can suppress the 
valid conclusion “Ana went to the theatre”). However, the chances of 
including an explicit negation in the abstract model (found-a-friend and 
did not-go-to-theatre) increase when we explicitly tell people about this 
instance. This is what happened in our Explicit condition. The problem 
with negation is that a mental footnote such as negation can be easily 
lost (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). When participants were allowed to 
create their particular cases, they could obtain a concrete mental model 
such as “found-a-friend and went to a party,” which would help to fix a 
more permanent mental model (instead of “found-a-friend not-theatre”, 
“found-a-friend party”). The search for counterexamples has an essential 
role in the mental model theory because it allows the construction of 
mental models (De Neys et al., 2003b; Markovits & Quinn, 2002) by 
fleshing out operations (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Khemlani et al., 
2018). Given a conditional, considering counterexamples consists of 
fleshing out the implicit models into explicit ones that can suppress in-
ferences. However, the theory would not predict an advantage for 
having many concrete mental models since a higher working memory 
load is not usually helpful (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Our results 
are consistent with this theory. 
Theories based on supposition and probabilistic logic explained the 
suppression effect based on the reduction of believability in a condi-
tional when participants received additional information (Oaksford & 
Chater, 2020; Over, 2017; Stevenson & Over, 1995). In particular, the 
Suppositional conditional theory assumes that people understand a 
conditional “if A, then B” considering only “A” but not “not-A” cases to 
compute the probability of “B” (Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004). 
When given new information, people revise the credibility of the first 
conditional, which explains suppression. From this approach, the sup-
pression effect for our Implicit condition can be explained by the effect 
of the conditional content. Thus, thinking about a disabling condi-
tional’s content leads them to consider the “A not-B” case, reducing the 
probability of their accepting “B” and, therefore, a reduction of MP valid 
inferences would be expected. On the other hand, the content of an 
alternative conditional that leads them to think of the “not-A B” case 
does not reduce the probability of their accepting “B”. Thus, consequent 
in conditional (6) is less likely to be accepted than consequent in con-
ditional (5), and therefore in the first case, suppression of MP is pre-
dicted. Previous studies have also shown that giving explicit information 
about the frequency or the existence of disabling or alternative condi-
tions increases the suppression (Geiger & Oberauer, 2007; Markovits 
et al., 2010). This could explain the increase of suppression in the 
Explicit condition in Experiment 1 when we explicitly told participants 
about alternatives or disabling conditions. 
However, it is not clear how to explain the results regarding the 
search for alternatives and disablers; participants had already been 
explicitly informed of their presence. For example, for disabling condi-
tionals, participants were told that the antecedent happened, but not the 
consequent. This explicit information should fix the reduction of credi-
bility in the conditional. We expected that later in the trial when par-
ticipants searched for counterexamples, they would obtain additional 
evidence that reduced the probability of the conditional. If this 
happened, why was there no effect of the number of alternatives? There 
was no more suppression in the Many cases condition than in that of the 
Few cases, in either experiment. 
Differences between probabilistic approaches and the mental model 
theory could lie in how statistical information is processed (Markovits 
et al., 2017). Although they might make similar predictions, Brisson 
et al. (2018) propose that the account based on probability could induce 
the use of different strategies from those of mental model theories. The 
mental model theory would explain that the manipulations in the pre-
sent study (the content of the conditional, given explicit information, 
and the search for counterexamples) increase the probability that par-
ticipants will suppress valid inferences by producing counterexamples 
based on the disabling conditions and reject fallacies when considering 
alternatives (Byrne et al., 1999; Juhos et al., 2015). 
Markovits et al. (2017) maintain that although the probabilistic 
approach (the p-validity model; see Evans et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 
2014) is in many respects very similar to the mental model description of 
the counterexample, different predictions could be made from it. The 
probabilistic approach evaluates the likelihood of a conclusion consid-
ering the full context of available knowledge. In contrast, the counter-
example search approach maintained by the mental model theory 
implies a narrower focus: a more concrete search for cases. If reasoners 
base their inferences on statistics, a broader contextual effect would be 
expected compared to those based on a counterexample search (Mar-
kovits et al., 2017; p.1183). 
The present study’s objective was to test whether the content of 
conditionals, explicit information, search for cases and search for 
counterexamples contribute to influencing how inferences are made. We 
have shown that these factors increase the suppression effects. We 
believe that these theories can integrate or explain our results ad hoc, 
but it is challenging to make exact predictions from the beginning. For 
example, following Markovits et al. (2017), we could attribute the 
suppression effect to the statistical approaches based on general 
knowledge and explicit information, but this is clearly not expected from 
the generated cases. From the model theory, we could expect a sup-
pression effect based on the generated cases and the meaning (based on 
the modulation effect, Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Assuming that 
with the content of the conditionals factor, participants have already 
established a believability criterion or have created a mental model, 
both approaches could have predicted the lack of effect of another factor 
(the explicit information and/or the search for counterexamples). The 
additive effect found in the three factors we study here provides, in our 
view, an important empirical fact that could help theories detail in more 
depth the algorithm for integrating evidence during the process of 
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deduction with conditionals. 
CRediT authorship contribution statement 
Jesica Gomez. She is finishing her doctoral thesis on developmental 
reasoning. This research is part of her thesis. Writing-original draft 
preparation. Design and conduct of experiments, data analysis. 
Sergio Moreno Ríos. Jesica’s Supervisor and expert on reasoning. 
Writing-original draft preparation. Conceptualization, Methodology. 
Writing draft preparation. 
Marta Couto. She is an expert on the suppression effect and had some 
of the original ideas in this research. She also conducted part of a pilot 
study. 
Cristina A. Quelhas. She is an expert on deductive reasoning and co- 
responsible for the original idea in this study. Also, she participated on 
the pilot study. 
Acknowledgments 
This research was funded by grants from the Spanish Government, 
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (PGC2018- 095868-B-I00) to 
SMR and the Education, Culture and Sport Ministry (FPU15/05899) to 
JGS.  
Appendix A. Mean of counterexamples (alternatives or disablers) generated for each conditional tested for the selection of the 6 
conditionals (3 alternatives and 3 disablers) for Experiments 1 and 2  
Conditional Alternatives generated Disablers generated 
1a  3.33  1.14 
2  1.66  2.14 
3  1.83  1.14 
4b  1  3 
5b  0.83  2.57 
6  1.66  2.57 
7a  4.43  2.5 
8  3.57  3.33 
9a  3.71  2.66 
10b  2.42  4.33 
11  3.28  2.5 
12  3  3.5  
a Conditionals selected as alternatives. 
b Conditionals selected as disablers. 
Appendix B. Conditionals used in the task (synonyms in brackets) and the original ones in italic 
Disabler sentences  
1. If Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre (big); Si Ana encuentra una amiga, entonces irá al teatro (grande)**  
2. If Sebastian puts the coffee pot on the stove, then the coffee will rise (happy); Si Sebastián pone la cafetera en el fuego, entonces subirá el café (feliz)**  
3. If Rafael goes to the airport by car, then he will arrive in time to catch his flight (sensitive); Si Rafael va en coche al aeropuerto, entonces llegará a 
tiempo para coger el avión (sensible)**  
4. If you strike a match, then it will be lit (rich); Si se frota una cerilla, entonces se encenderá (rico)  
5. If you press the right switch, then the light will turn on (tenacious); Si se pulsa el interruptor correcto, entonces la luz se encenderá (constante)  
6. If Vera turns on the air conditioning, then she will be cold (good); Si Vera enciende el aire acondicionado, entonces tendrá frío (bueno) 
Alternative sentences  
7. If María jumps into a swimming pool, then she will get wet (beautiful); Si María salta a una piscina, entonces se mojará (bonito)**  
8. If Beatriz’s phone is dropped, then it will break (kind); Si a Beatriz se le cae el móvil, entonces se le romperá (simpático)**  
9. If Cristina drinks coffee at night, then she will have difficulty sleeping (easy); Si Cristina bebe café por la noche, entonces tendrá dificultad para 
dormir (fácil)**  
10. If Teresa eats salt, then she will be thirsty (intelligent); Si Teresa come sal, entonces tendrá sed (inteligente)  
11. If Tiago reads without glasses, then he will have a headache (expressive); Si Tiago lee sin gafas, entonces tendrá dolor de cabeza (expresivo)  
12. If Daniel pours water on a camp fire, then the fire will go out (calm); Si Daniel echa agua en la hoguera, entonces el fuego se apagará (tranquilo) 
*As the materials were in Spanish, it is important to take into account that in the case of synonyms, most of them are polysemic, unlike in English. 
**Conditionals selected from a pilot study. 
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Appendix C. Results by inference in the two experiments 
Table C1 
Mean frequencies of acceptances for each inference (AC,MP,MT,DA) (with “nothing follows” in parentheses) for Condition (explicit, implicit), Counterexample Type 
(alternatives, disablers) and Group (few items, many items) in Experiment 1. In bold the logically correct response.   
Alternatives Disablers 
MP MT AC DA MP MT AC DA 
Explicit 
Few items 2.69 (0.28) 2.28 (0.66) 0.53 (2.47) 0.59 (2.31) 1.06 (1.94) 0.97 (1.97) 2.38 (0.59) 2.44 (0.53) 
Many items 2.55 (0.32) 2.39 (0.58) 0.81 (2.06) 0.77 (2.19) 1.13 (1.84) 1.39 (1.58) 2.39 (0.55) 2.32 (0.61) 
Average 2.62 (0.30) 2.33 (0.62) 0.67 (2.27) 0.68 (2.25) 1.10 (1.89) 1.18 (1.78) 2.38 (0.57) 2.38 (0.57)  
Implicit 
Few items 2.78 (0.22) 2.66 (0.31) 1.21 (1.78) 1.44 (1.50) 2.50 (0.50) 2.22 (0.72) 2.19 (0.75) 2.19 (0.75) 
Many items 2.74 (0.26) 2.42 (0.52) 1.61 (1.35) 1.42 (1.52) 2.42 (0.52) 2.39 (0.58) 2.42 (0.52) 2.23 (0.71) 
Average 2.76 (0.24) 2.54 (0.41) 1.42 (1.57) 1.43 (1.51) 2.46 (0.51) 2.30 (0.65) 2.30 (0.63) 2.21 (0.73)   
Table C2 
Mean frequencies of acceptances for each inference (AC,MP,MT,DA) (with “nothing follows” in parentheses) for Condition (counterexample, synonyms), Counter-
example Type (alternatives, disablers) and Group (few items, many items) in Experiment 2. In bold the logically correct response.   
Alternatives Disablers 
MP MT AC DA MP MT AC DA 
Counterexample 
Few items 2.97 (0.27) 2.30 (0.88) 1.39 (1.67) 1.18 (1.70) 1.33 (1.12) 1.24 (1.36) 2.21 (0.30) 2.27 (0.33) 
Many items 2.85 (0.21) 2.21 (0.76) 1.21 (1.64) 1.15 (1.58) 1.70 (0.91) 1.21 (1.36) 2.18 (0.64) 2.00 (0.73) 
Average 2.91 (0.24) 2.26 (0.82) 1.30 (1.65) 1.17 (1.64) 1.52 (1.02) 1.23 (1.36) 2.20 (0.47) 2.14 (0.53)  
Synonyms 
Few items 2.39 (0.30) 2.12 (0.49) 1.85 (0.82) 1.82 (0.70) 2.33 (0.67) 1.91 (1.00) 2.88 (0.30) 2.76 (0.52) 
Many items 2.48 (0.30) 2.09 (0.67) 1.42 (1.27) 1.39 (1.24) 1.97 (1.00) 1.73 (1.21) 2.58 (0.52) 2.45 (0.58) 
Average 2.44 (0.30) 2.11 (0.58) 1.64 (1.05) 1.61 (0.97) 2.15 (0.83) 1.82 (1.11) 2.73 (0.41) 2.61 (0.55)  
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